It is generally believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is ruled out in principle by a "no-go theorem". We point out that the theorem only establishes the existence of a cheating unitary operator in any scheme of quantum bit commitment, however there is no proof that the unitary operator is always known to the cheating party, hence it does not necessarily follow that quantum bit commitment is insecure. In this work, we propose a scheme where the cheating party cannot construct the required unitary operator because it depends on the other party's unknown random choices; consequently the scheme is not breakable even with the help of a quantum computer.
Quantum information and quantum computation is a field of intense activities in recent years. The idea of applying quantum mechanics in cryptography was first introduced in the late 1960's [1, 2] . So far, the most well known and successful applications are found in the area of quantum key distribution [3, 4] . Other important quantum cryptographic protocols include quantum bit commitment (QBC) [5, 6] , quantum oblivious transfer [7, 8] , quantum coin tossing [3, 5] , and so on. QBC is a basic protocol, or primitive, which can be used to construct other more sophisticated protocols. In particular, it is known that quantum oblivious transfer [9, 10] can be implemented upon QBC. Furthermore it is also known that, in classical cryptography, one can use oblivious transfer to build any two-party cryptographic protocols [11] . Hence the security of QBC is an issue of great potential importance.
A QBC protocol involves a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob). Alice is secretly committed to a bit b (0 or 1), which she wants to communicate to Bob at a later time. In order to assure Bob that she will not change her mind in the interim period, Alice gives Bob a quantum mechanical wave function which can later be used to verify her honesty. A QBC protocol is secure if (a) Alice cannot change her commitment without being discovered (binding), and (b) Bob can obtain no knowledge of Alice's commitment before she discloses it (concealing). An unconditionally secure protocol is one which is secure even if Alice and Bob were endowed with unlimited computational power.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new QBC scheme and prove its unconditionally security. Our result contradicts the widely held belief that unconditionally secure QBC is impossible [12] [13] [14] [15] . To explain the crux of the matter, we adopt the following simple model of QBC: (1) Commitment Phase: Alice and Bob agree on a security parameter n. Depending on the value of b, Alice generates an n-particle state |ψ
AB which is also known to Bob. Alice measures sector-A of the wave functions, and transfers the control over sector-B to Bob. (2) Unveiling Phase: After an arbitrary length of time, Alice discloses her commitment bit b, and also the data from her measurements. To verify Alice's honesty, Bob measures the particles in his possession and checks that his data and Alice's are indeed properly correlated according to |ψ AB . In order that Bob cannot prematurely obtain any information about the commitment by himself, the reduced density matrix of the particles in his control,
must be independent of b (in the ideal case), i.e.,
It then follows from the Schmidt decomposition [16, 17] of |ψ
AB that there exists an unitary operator U A , acting on sector-A only, such that
The fact that Alice can by herself transform |ψ
AB into |ψ B is independent of when or how Alice measures her particles, there is no way for Bob to tell if she did carry out the required measurements in the commitment phase. As a result Alice does not have to make up her mind in the beginning, and this is cheating. It has been claimed that this result is model independent, so that unconditionally secure QBC is ruled out in principle [12] [13] [14] [15] . This is sometimes referred to as the "no-go theorem". In short, this theorem asserts that, because of quantum entanglement, no QBC scheme can be unconditionally secure against cheating by Alice and Bob at the same time; in particular, if a scheme is secure against Bob, then Alice can always cheat with an EPR attack as outlined above.
So, is unconditionally secure QBC really ruled out as a matter of principle? Our answer is negative. The crucial point to note is that the "no-go theorem" only establishes the existence of an cheating unitary operator in every conceivable QBC scheme, however it does not necessarily follow that QBC is insecure, because there is no proof that the unitary operator is always known to the cheating party. In fact, as we shall show, it is possible to construct a scheme which is secure against Bob, but Alice is unable to carry out the EPR attack because the cheating unitary operator depends on Bob's unknown random choices. Hence the scheme is unconditionally secure even if Alice has a quantum computer to perform any specifiable unitary transformations.
Before proceeding further, let us define the notations to be used, and establish an important preliminary result. The spin operator of a spin-1/2 particle is given by
where σ are Pauli matrices. In terms of eigen-spinors of s z (or σ z ), | ↑ and | ↓ , we define
and
where | ↑↓↑ ≡ | ↑ 1 | ↓ 2 | ↑ 3 , and etc. |Ψ (b) can be rewritten as
where | ↑ x and | ↓ x are eigen-spinors of σ x :
Consider a sequence of n identical |Ψ (b) 's,
Its particles are labelled as
so that S (b) can be divided into three parallel sub-sequences:
where
If Alice measures Σ 
Therefore, given S 2 ) along some arbitrary unit vectors {ê i } in the xy-plane, then he will no longer be able to distinguish between S (0) z and S (1) z . The reason is that, for each such measurement, the probability of obtaining "spin-up" or "spin-down" is always 1/2, independent of the quantum state (| ↑↓ , | ↓↑ , | ↑↑ , or | ↓↓ ) being measured; consequently the measured and unmeasured spins become uncorrelated. Explicitly, after the forced measurements, Σ 
whereê i ·ẑ = 0, {α i } ∈ {↑, ↓} n , and |ê i α i is an eigen-spinor of σ ·ê i (such that |x ↑ ≡ | ↑ x , and etc.).
Suppose at the beginning Alice measured Σ x must also be indistinguishable after being measured in the xy-plane as described above. This is the important preliminary result we want to establish.
We are now ready to specify the new QBC scheme. This scheme contains two crucial features: (a) Alice prepares distinguishable quantum sequences for b = 0 and b = 1, and (b) Bob is forced to perform certain measurements so that they become indistinguishable. x . In the notations of Eqs. (14-16), we write
Next, Alice prepares a "detector" sequencẽ
She takes one particle from each state inS x . Having specified the new QBC scheme, we proceed to prove that it is concealing. First of all, we note that if Bob is honest in the commitment phase, then he cannot cheat afterward (even if Σ 
so there exists an unitary operator which would in principle allow Alice to cheat without Bob's knowledge. The problem is, if Bob honestly performed the required measurements in the commitment phase, then ρ ′(b) depends on the set of measurement axes {ê i }, which is unknown to Alice. On the other hand, if Bob followed a quantum strategy and left the measurement axes undetermined, then ρ ′(b) depends on the set of probability amplitudes {p k } as shown in Eqs. (25, 28), which is again unknown to Alice. Therefore in either case, Alice lacks sufficient information to carry out the EPR attack − she does not know what unitary operator to apply. (2) From a different point of view, since cheating by Alice is our only concern here, we may assume Bob to be honest; so that detector particles and randomization of Σ x are distinctly different. This concludes the proof that our new QBC scheme is unconditionally secure.
In summary, we have constructed a new QBC scheme and proved that it is unconditionally secure. In this scheme, although a cheating unitary operator exists, it is not known to Alice; consequently EPR cheating is impossible. With regard to the widely accepted "no-go theorem" [12] [13] [14] [15] , we observe that the theorem only establishes the existence of a cheating unitary operator in every conceivable QBC scheme, but since the unitary operator is not necessarily known to the cheating party, unconditionally secure QBC is possible after all.
Appendix
The spin-spin correlation function is defined by 
It follows that, for these states, the outcomes are perfectly correlated when one particle is measured along an arbitrary axisê and the other alongê 
These results can be easily generalized to arbitrary spin states.
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